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This paper provides new evidence on the relation between incentive compensation and 
acquisition performance. We find that higher sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock-price changes, 
Delta, is positively associated with post-acquisition stock-price performance and that higher sensitivity 
of executives’ wealth to stock-return volatility, Vega, leads to risk-increasing acquisitions only when 
the target is a non-publicly listed firm. In public deals, we find no difference in the deal synergies 
available to acquiring firm’s shareholders between high and low incentivised managers and no relation 
between incentive compensation and the quality of M&A decisions in terms of risk and stock-price 
returns. Our results are robust to a number of deal and firm characteristics and to controls for selection 
bias and endogeneity. Our findings suggest that when a publicly listed firm is acquired, the increased 
negotiation power of the target and information asymmetry considerations offset the positive impact of 
incentive compensation on both stock-price performance and risk-taking 
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1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can be considered as one of the most important 
investment decisions managers make in terms of resource allocation and value creation 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Harford and Li, 2007; Zhao, 2013). However, the decision to 
acquire does not always benefit the shareholders of the bidding firm (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Moeller et al., 2004).  Previous research documents significant losses for acquiring 
shareholders in public deals (Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006) whereas acquirers of 
private targets appear to experience positive gains (Conn et al., 2005; Draper and Paudyal, 
2006). While a number of possible explanations have been given in the literature for this 
phenomenon (Hansen and Lott, 1996; Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Officer et al., 2009) no 
study so far has considered the role of managerial incentives in explaining differences in 
performance between acquirers of public and non-public firms. 
The way executives are compensated is believed to play an important role in mitigating 
the principal-agent problem initially identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) suggest that providing managers with some form of incentive compensation 
such as share ownership can align their interests with those of shareholders improving the 
quality of managerial decisions. More recent studies have found strong evidence to support the 
benefits of incentive compensation showing that it can strengthen company performance 
(Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 2003) and increase shareholder value (Billet et al., 2010). In the 
area of M&As, Datta et al., (2001) and Minnick et al., (2011) document a positive relation 
between equity-based compensation and deal performance. Incentive pay can further benefit 
shareholders by mitigating managerial risk aversion inducing managers to invest in risky 
profitable projects that they may otherwise forgo (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Guay, 1999; 
Coles et al., 2006). Better incentivised managers are found to make riskier acquisition decisions 
creating value for acquiring shareholders (Datta et al., 2001; Croci and Petmezas, 2015).   
Using an extended sample (1993-2010) of U.S. mergers and acquisitions, this paper 
investigates for first time the role of compensation-related incentives in the quality of corporate 
acquisition decisions conditional on the legal status of the target firm. Given that appropriately 
structured executive compensation contracts can mitigate agency costs and benefit 
shareholders, the value destruction of acquiring shareholders in public deals is likely to result 
from suboptimal compensation contracts or perverted incentives of the acquiring managers. 
Alternatively, managers may respond differently to the same incentives conditional on the legal 
status of the target firm. The latter can in turn be related to a number of other factors such as 
information asymmetry or the increased negotiation power of publicly listed firms (Officer, 
2007) that can render incentive compensation inefficient in public deals. 
Confirming previous research findings (Fuller et al., 2002; Conn et al., 2005; Faccio et 
al., 2006), we show that acquirers of publicly listed firms experience lower announcement and 
long-run abnormal returns relative to acquirers of non-public firms. We further contribute to 
the literature by providing new evidence on the relation between incentive compensation and 
the quality of acquisition decisions. We find that, according to our expectations, better 
incentivised managers experience higher post-acquisition short and long-run returns and make 
riskier decisions when the target is not a publicly listed firm. However, we provide empirical 
evidence that compensation incentives are rendered inefficient in public deals. Our results show 
that better incentivised managers who acquire public targets fail to offer higher synergies in 
the short-run or improved long-run stock-price performance to their shareholders. Moreover, 
although pubic deals appear to increase the volatility of bidder’s stock returns significantly 
more than non-public deals, we find that the higher riskiness of public deals is not related to 
risk-taking incentives that acquiring managers are provided with via their compensation 
contracts. 
In addition, our results reveal another striking view: although acquisitions of public 
targets are, theoretically, different type of deals than acquisitions of non-public firms, both 
types of acquiring managers are provided with similar equity-related incentives. Nevertheless, 
this “one size fits all” approach does not appear to work in the case of public deals. Our results 
can therefore have important implications for market participants. Independent remuneration 
committees should take the strategic objectives of the firm into account when designing 
executive compensation contracts. Given the potentially high cost of equity-related incentives 
to company shareholders, compensation contracts of managers that plan to expand by acquiring 
publicly listed firms should be redesigned so that to keep such costs to the minimum and, at 
the same time, achieve value-maximisation objectives.  
 The decreased efficiency of incentive compensation in public deals can be attributed to 
a number of reasons including the increased bargaining power of public targets (Officer, 2007) 
and the more efficient disclosure or information between the bidder and target shareholders 
(Conn et al., 2005) in private deals. Moreover, equity-related incentives provided to the 
managers of publicly listed targets can offset the impact of those provided to the managers of 
the acquiring firm. Therefore, the same type of compensation incentives may be perceived 
differently by acquiring managers conditional on the legal status of the target firm. Overall, the 
findings of this paper suggest that the inefficiency of incentive compensation contracts in 
acquisitions of publicly listed firms can, at least partly, provide an explanation for the value 
destruction of acquiring shareholders in such type of deals. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the 
literature followed by Section 3 that develops our hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the 
construction of the sample. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics of the variables included in 
the analysis and Section 6 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Target Status and Deal Performance 
There is extensive evidence that the bidding shareholders lose when a public firm is 
acquired. Hansen and Lott (1996) show that acquirers of private targets experience on average 
two percent higher abnormal returns compared to acquirers of public targets. Fuller et al. (2002) 
report positive gains for acquiring shareholders when a private firm is acquired but significant 
losses for the bidding firm when the target is a publicly listed firm. Similarly, Officer et al. 
(2007) find lower announcement returns for bidding firms in public deals relative to those in 
private deals. 
Deal underperformance when a publicly listed firm is acquired is also documented by 
studies that examine M&A activity outside the US. Using a sample of UK mergers and 
acquisitions, Conn et al. (2005) find negative announcement returns for domestic public 
acquisitions but positive returns for domestic private deals. Regarding long-run post-
acquisition performance, acquirers of public targets experience negative returns while the long-
run returns of acquirers of private targets are not statistically different than zero. Examining 
mergers and acquisitions in 17 Western European countries, Faccio et al. (2006) document 
significant positive abnormal returns for acquirers of unlisted targets but insignificant negative 
abnormal returns for acquirers of listed firms. In addition, they show that the target listing effect 
persists across countries and through time. In another UK study, Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
find that acquirers of private firms earn significant positive announcement returns while 
acquirers of listed firms either break-even or suffer small losses. In line with the findings of 
Faccio et al. (2006), Draper and Paudyal (2006) show that the target listing effect is persistent 
over time. 
The underperformance of public deals is also implicitly evident from studies that 
examine acquisitions of publicly listed firms only. For instance, Travlos (1987) documents 
significant losses for acquiring shareholders at the announcement of stock deals when a public 
firm is acquired. In contrast, Chang (1998) find significantly positive abnormal returns for the 
bidding firm when a privately held firm is acquired using stock. Morck et al. (1990) find a 
negative relation between acquisition abnormal returns and diversifying deals but their study 
is based on acquisitions of public targets only. Similarly, the study of Andrade et al. (2001) 
that documents significantly negative abnormal long-run returns for the acquiring firm is based 
on a sample of public deals. 
3. Explanation of Public Deals Underperformance and Hypotheses Development 
A number of different explanations have been provided for the documented 
underperformance of the acquiring firms in public deals. Acquiring shareholders in private 
stock deals may be benefited from the creation of large blockholders from the target 
shareholders who can act as effective monitors of managerial performance (Chang, 1998; 
Fuller et al., 2002). In contrast, this does not happen when publicly listed firms are acquired. 
Hansen and Lott (1996) argue that bidders’ underperformance in public deals cannot 
be explained by differences in the degree of freedom between private and public targets. If 
private targets have more freedom in choosing the most appropriate to them auction method 
compared to public targets1 then the bidders’ gains in public acquisitions should have been 
larger than those in private deals. Officer (2007) attributes this phenomenon to the greater 
bargaining power of public targets relative to private targets showing that shareholders of 
private firms depend more on the bidding firm to allow them to sell out and meet their liquidity 
                                                          
1 Public targets may be restricted by legal requirements in choosing their auction methods (Hansen and Lott, 
1996). 
needs. In a later paper, Officer et al. (2009) argue that information asymmetry can also explain 
the lower announcement returns in public deals as the market appears to react more positively 
to acquisitions of “difficult-to-value” firms. In an international study, Alexandridis et al. (2010) 
find that that the distribution of acquisition gains between acquiring and target shareholders 
depends on the level of competition in the market for corporate control. They show that 
acquirers in less competitive markets than the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada 
realize gains in public acquisition announcements whereas target shareholders gain 
significantly less. 
This study identifies and covers an important literature gap by examining the role of 
managerial incentives in explaining differences in performance between public and non-public 
deals. The purpose of incentive compensation is to mitigate agency costs by tying the wealth 
of managers to that of shareholders. Datta et al. (2001) and Lahlou and Navatte (2017) show 
that acquiring managers with higher proportions of equity-based compensation make better 
acquisition decisions experiencing higher announcement and long-run abnormal returns 
compared to lower incentivised managers. Minnick et al. (2011) also provide supportive 
evidence of the positive relation between incentive compensation and deal performance 
showing that acquisitions made by managers with high pay-for-performance sensitivity (Delta) 
earn higher announcement returns and experience greater improvements in the operating 
performance compared to deals initiated by managers with low pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. Boulton et al. (2014) find that managers with a higher proportion of equity-based 
compensation are more likely to acquire private firms which are not associated with value 
destruction for acquiring shareholders. 
Therefore, given that acquiring shareholders lose in public deals, we posit that the 
incentives provided to acquiring managers of public targets cannot efficiently mitigate agency 
costs and lead to value-increasing decisions. Incentive compensation can be rendered 
inefficient in public deals for a number of reasons. The higher bargaining power of public 
targets (Officer, 2007; 2009) along with the increased levels of information asymmetry 
between the bidder and target shareholders (Conn et al., 2005) are likely to offset the positive 
impact of incentive compensation on the quality of acquisition decisions in public deals.  In 
addition, equity-related incentives provided to the directors of publicly listed targets can have 
an opposing and offsetting impact on those provided to acquiring managers given the conflict 
of interests between the bidder and the target. Consequently, even if acquiring managers of 
public targets are provided with the same incentives as their counterparts who acquire non-
public firms, these incentives may be rendered inefficient as they are perceived differently by 
acquiring managers in public deals. In order to test whether differences in performance between 
public and non-public deals can be explained by managerial incentives, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Deal performance is positively related to compensation incentives only when the 
target is a non-publicly listed firm. 
Furthermore, the value destruction in public acquisitions is likely to stem from 
increased managerial risk-aversion. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that if managers are not 
provided with sufficient incentives via their compensation contracts, they are likely to forgo 
valuable projects that increase firm risk. Datta et al. (2001) find that equity-based compensation 
mitigates managerial risk-aversion and leads to value and risk increasing acquisitions. Edmans 
and Gabaix (2011) argue that risk-averse managers should be provided with greater risk-taking 
incentives in order to be sufficiently induced to take on risky projects. Confirming the 
predictions of Edmans and Gabaix (2011), Croci and Petmezas (2015) find a positive relation 
between pay-risk sensitivity (Vega) and the riskiness of acquisition decisions. 
Usually, non-public targets are associated with higher information asymmetry (Officer 
et al., 2009) due to the lower volume of publicly available information for such type of firms. 
On the other hand, Conn et al. (2005) note that acquirers are able to disclose private information 
more efficiently to the concentrated shareholders of a private target due to the lack of publicity 
surrounding private deals. The latter mitigates, at least partly, information asymmetry concerns 
when a privately held firm is acquired. Risk-averse managers are likely to forgo acquisition 
decisions characterised by high levels of information asymmetry unless they are provided with 
sufficient incentives to overcome such concerns. Therefore, if managers are not provided with 
the appropriate risk-taking incentives, they are more likely to be engaged in public deals given 
that it is, generally, easier to access information about publicly listed firms. In other words, 
risk-averse managers can forgo valuable but riskier acquisitions of private targets when risk-
taking is not efficiently induced by their compensation contracts. In order to examine whether 
the riskiness of acquisition decisions conditional on the legal status of the target firm is related 
to risk-taking incentives, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: Risk-taking incentives are positively associated with the riskiness of acquisition 
decisions only when the target is a non-publicly listed firm. 
4. Data and Sample Selection 
4.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
The sample contains all completed domestic US2 mergers and acquisitions with an 
announcement and effective date between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2010 using the 
SDC Platinum database. Following Aktas et al. (2013), the selected transactions are those that 
have been classified as mergers, acquisitions, acquisitions of majority interest, acquisitions of 
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assets, acquisitions of certain assets, acquisitions of remaining interest, and exchange offers. In 
addition, the disclosed deal value of the transaction should be at least $1 million3, the acquirer4 
should be a publicly listed company owning less than 50 percent of the target’s shares six 
months prior to the acquisition announcement and hold at least 50 percent after the transaction 
so that an explicit change of control can be ensured.  The number of transactions that meet 
these criteria is 28,751. 
We match these transactions to firms in the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database 
for executive compensation data. ExecuComp provides compensation data on the top five 
highest compensated officers for firms in the S&P 1500 Index. We require that the acquiring 
firm should have executive compensation data available in ExecuComp for the year preceding 
the acquisition announcement to control for the possibility that executive compensation has 
been affected by the transaction. Since ExecuComp does not provide compensation data prior 
to 1992, the starting year of our M&A sample is 1993. The final sample selection criterion is 
the availability of stock price and accounting data for the bidding firm at the time of the 
acquisition announcement in the merged CRSP/Compustat database. The sample ends in 2010 
so that a three-year post-acquisition stock-price performance can be calculated. The final 
sample size is 7,859 transactions made by 1,926 firms.  
4.2 Compensation Variables 
The analysis is based on compensation characteristics of the top management team 
which is defined as the top five executives as ranked by the ExecuComp database.  Coles et al. 
                                                          
3 All dollar values in the analysis are adjusted for consumer price inflation and expressed in 2010 USD. The 
inclusion of the deal value criterion is important for the analysis as SDC Platinum does not report method of 
payment for those transactions without a disclosed deal value. 
4 Since all transactions in our sample are completed acquisitions, the terms acquirer and bidder or acquiring and 
bidding firm are used interchangeably.  
 
(2006) argue that the vast majority of studies that examine the effectiveness of executive 
compensation incentives use simplified proxies to capture managerial incentives such as the 
value and volume of new options and stock grants, scaled and unscaled numbers of options and 
stock held, the sum of these etc. However, such variables are only noisy proxies of managerial 
incentives and are disconnected from important characteristics of incentive compensation as 
the latter are captured by Delta (pay-performance sensitivity) and Vega (pay-risk sensitivity) 
(Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006).  For instance, new stock and option grants ignore 
the impact of previous grants on managers’ option portfolio while scaled numbers of options 
and stock held do not take into consideration important aspects of the equity portfolio such as 
the time to maturity, exercise price and the volatility of the underlying asset).  
We therefore, define Delta as the dollar change in the wealth of the top five executives 
for a one percent change in the firm’s stock price and Vega as the dollar change in the wealth 
of top five executives for a one percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock 
returns. The calculation of Delta and Vega follow the approach developed by Core and Guay 
(2002) and Coles et al., (2006) based on the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation model as 
modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividends. Similar to previous studies, we also 
control for the impact of cash compensation in our analysis defining Cash_Comp as the sum 
of salary and bonus payments to the top five executives. Furthermore, parts of the (univariate) 
analysis scale the above compensation variables by total compensation to control for firm size. 
Total compensation (Total_Comp) is defined as the sum of top five executives’ salary, bonus, 
new stock and option grants and other forms of compensation from ExecuComp. Lagged values 
of compensation variables are used in the analysis when examining firm performance so that 
to ensure that compensation incentives have been granted before the acquisition decision. 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Sample Distribution 
Table 1 presents the distribution of mergers and acquisitions in our sample. The effect 
of the dotcom crash in 2001 and global credit crunch that started in 2007 is evident from the 
substantial drop in acquisitions during these periods. Public deals are 24 percent of the total 
sample and they show a similar distribution with a peak at the late 90s just before the corporate 
scandals in the US and the substantial drop in stock prices after the crash of the internet bubble 
in 20015. M&A activity regarding subsidiary and public deals follows a similar pattern.  
Table 1 also presents information on the relative size of M&A deals over time. 
Relative_Size is the value of the transaction as reported in SDC Platinum divided by the market 
capitalization of the acquirer 4 weeks before the acquisition announcement. Bidders make 
relatively more expensive acquisitions (14 percent of their market value) during the period of 
intense M&A activity between 1995 and 2000. The average value of transactions falls to 11 
percent after 2000 to result in an average deal size of 12 percent for the total sample period. 
Asquith et al. (1983) find a positive relation between relative size and bidder announcement 
returns while Travlos (1987) reports a negative one. 
Table 1 also presents the distribution of the method of payment as it has been found to 
be an important determinant of deal performance (Travlos, 1987, Datta et al., 2001; Golubov 
et al., 2012) and it therefore forms a key variable in our analysis. Payment_Cash is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed only with cash and zero otherwise. 
Payment_Equity is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed only 
with stock and zero otherwise. Mixed_Financing is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the deal is financed with more than one means of payment (for example, cash plus equity, 
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equity plus debt, earnout plus cash or any combination of these) and zero otherwise.  Cash 
transactions dominated the sample period with 4,034 transactions (51 percent of the total 
sample) compared to 1,500 equity (19 percent) and 2,325 (30 percent) mixed financing 
transactions.  
5.2 Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics for all compensation variables and firm 
characteristics included in the analysis. As noted in Section 4.2, all acquiring firms included in 
the sample have compensation data available in ExecuComp database for the year preceding 
the acquisition announcement which can be seen from the number of observations of 
Cash_Comp and Total_Comp. However, for 260 acquiring firm-years, the data provided by 
ExecuComp are not sufficient for the computations of Delta and Vega of the top five 
managerial portfolio. The average management team in our sample receives a total annual 
compensation of $17m of which 28 percent is provided in the form of cash compensation 
(salary and bonus). The total wealth of the top five acquiring executives changes by $3m per 
annum on average for a one percent change in the firm’s stock price (Delta) and increases by 
$440,000 if the volatility of the firm’s stock returns increases by one percent (Vega). These 
figures are comparable to those of previous studies (Coles et al., 2006) after taking into account 
inflationary differences6 and the fact that we have a number of big multiple acquirers in our 
sample7. 
All control variables included in the analysis have been identified as important 
determinants of bidder’s performance by previous studies. Size is the natural logarithm of 
bidder's market value four weeks preceding the acquisition announcement date. Moeller et al. 
                                                          
6 Coles et al., (2006) report all dollar values in 2002 USD whereas we use 2010 as our base year. 
7 It has been shown that there is a strong positive relation between firm size and executive compensation (Khorana 
and Zenner, 1998; Bliss and Rosen, 2001) 
(2004) show that large acquiring firms experience lower announcement period returns than 
small bidders irrespectively of other firm and deal characteristics. Leverage is calculated as the 
acquirer’s book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets at the end of the year 
preceding the acquisition announcement. Maloney et al. (1993) find a positive relation between 
leverage and acquisition performance and a negative relation between firm size and leverage. 
Along with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004), these results suggest that small firms with 
higher levels of debt are likely to make more successful acquisitions. The average and median 
firm size in our sample are very similar to each other (about $14 billions) while the average 
acquiring firm employees leverage equal to 23 percent of its total assets.   
Runup is the acquiring firm’s buy-and-hold return from 205 days to 6 days before the 
acquisition announcement date minus the buy-and-hold return of the matched firm for the 
contemporaneous period.  In line with previous studies, our sample bidders are matched with 
non-acquiring firms8 (firms that have not been involved in any acquisition activity for a 3-year 
period surrounding the effective day) based on year, industry9,  market capitalization value and 
book-to-market ratio10. If a matched firm is delisted before the completion of the three-year 
post-acquisition period, it is substituted with the next closest matched firm on the delisting 
date11. Controlling for past stock price performance is important as previous research has 
documented a negative relation between acquirers’ run-up and acquisition returns (Rosen, 
2006). Furthermore, according to Jensen’s (1988) theory of free cash flows, managers of good 
                                                          
8 Harford and Li (2007), Duchin and Schmidt (2013). 
9 Billett et al. (2010), Duchin and Schmidt (2013). Industries are defined based on the Fama and French (1997) 
classification of 48 industries 
10 Barber and Lyon (1997) note that empirical test statistics are well-specified when they are based on the size and 
book-to-market ratio control firm approach. See also Spiess and Affleck (1999) and Datta et al. (2001). 
11 30 acquirers without available data on market capitalization and book-to-market value in the year end before 
the announcement are excluded from the analysis. 747 out of the remaining 7,829 transactions are matched with 
two firms as the first matched firm is delisted before the passage of three years from the transaction date. Similarly, 
81 acquirers are matched with three firms and 14 acquirers are matched with four firms that best meet the matching 
criteria. In 5 cases where no match was possible after the delisting of the first two best matched firms, the industry 
criterion was dropped.  
past performers may destroy value in acquisitions by overpaying for targets. When the acquirer 
overpays for the target, the market reaction is expected to be negative (Baker et al., 2012). In 
line with expectations, Table 2 shows that the majority of acquirers in our sample have 
experienced positive abnormal returns in the period preceding the acquisition announcement. 
As a further control for managerial hubris we calculate the amount of cash available to 
acquiring managers as excess cash can increase managerial hubris resulting in poor acquisition 
decisions (Harford, 1999). Following Coles et al. (2006), Cash/Assets is defined as bidder’s 
cash and cash equivalents divided by the book value of total assets at the end of the year 
preceding the acquisition announcement. In addition, as the time period the CEO has remained 
in the office can increase managerial entrenchment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), we define 
CEO_Tenure as the number of months the CEO is in the office before the acquisition 
announcement. 
Conn et al., (2005) find that acquirers with low book-to-market ratio (Glamour firms) 
underperform in public acquisitions but not in private acquisitions. In contrast, only high book-
to-market bidders experience negative long-term returns in private acquisitions.  Dong et al. 
(2006) document a positive relation between bidder’s book-to-market ratio and acquisition 
announcement returns. Similarly, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that the poor bidder’s post-
acquisition performance can be attributed to acquirers with low book-to-market ratio. We 
control for this factor by including acquirer’s B/M ratio in the analysis. B/M is defined as the 
book value of equity of the acquiring firm divided by its market value at the end of the year 
before the acquisition announcement.  
Table 2 also presents summary statistics of a number of other firm characteristics that 
previous research has identified as important determinants of deal synergies, stock return 
volatility, Delta and Vega that are also examined in this paper. ROA is the operating income of 
the acquiring firm before depreciation divided by book value of total assets at the end of the 
year preceding the acquisition announcement. Sales_Growth is defined as the logarithm of the 
ratio of bidder’s sales in the year preceding the acquisition announcement (t-1) to sales in the 
previous year (t-2). Since risk-taking incentives are positively related to the firm’s investment 
opportunities (Guay, 1999) a positive relation between sales growth and firm risk is expected. 
Sigma is the standard deviation of the acquirer’s market-adjusted daily returns from 205 to 6 
days before the acquisition announcement date and is used as a determinant of synergy gains 
(Golubov et al., 2012). R&D is the acquirer’s research and development expenditure to book 
value of total assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement12. Net_PPE 
is defined as the acquirer’s net expenditure in property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets at the end of the year before the acquisition announcement. CAPEX is the capital 
expenditures of the acquiring firm scaled by total assets at the end of the year preceding the 
acquisition announcement. A positive relation between firm risk and R&D is expected while 
risk averse managers are expected to invest a higher a proportion of capital in Net_PPE and 
CAPEX (Coles et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2013). The values of all variables presented in this 
section is similar to those reported in previous studies (Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al., 2006, 
Cohen et al., 2013, Croci and Petmezas, 2015) and their definitions are summarized in the 
Appendix. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Target Status and Executive Compensation 
Table 3 compares compensation characteristics of acquiring managers that make public 
acquisitions with those of managers that acquire non-public firms. Panel A shows that acquirers 
of public targets provide stronger incentives to their managers compared to acquirers of non-
public targets. The average Delta is 2.207m dollars higher for managers that acquire public 
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firms than that of managers who initiate non-public deals. Similarly, the average Vega is 
138,340 dollars higher for acquirers of public targets relative to acquirers of non-public targets. 
Acquiring managers of public targets also appear to be more generously compensated in terms 
of salary and cash bonuses as their average cash compensation is higher by 1.257m dollars 
compared to that of managers who make non-public acquisitions. All differences are significant 
at the 5 percent level or better. 
However, the analysis in Panel A is based on dollar values raising concerns that the 
results may be driven by firm size. This emanates from the fact that public firms are more likely 
to be acquired by large bidders and that executive compensation increases with firm size 
(Khorana and Zenner, 1998; Bliss and Rosen, 2001). Based on the findings of Edmans et al. 
(2009) that the dollar change in executives’ wealth from stock and option holdings divided by 
total annual compensation is independent of firm size, Panel B presents compensation 
characteristics scaled by total compensation. The results show that, controlling for firm size, 
acquiring managers of public targets are not better incentivised than their counterparts who 
acquire private or non-public firms. Delta and Vega are still higher for acquiring managers of 
public firms but the differences are now statistically insignificant. In contrast, acquirers of non-
public targets appear to receive a higher proportion of cash compensation with the difference 
being statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The absence of statistical significance in 
the difference between equity-related incentives (Delta and Vega) provided to the acquiring 
managers of public and non-public targets mitigates potential endogeneity concerns as 
compensation committees appear to provide the same type of incentives to acquiring managers 
regardless of whether the latter initiate acquisitions of public or non-public firms. However, 
given that acquirers of non-public targets receive a higher proportion of cash compensation 
than acquirers of public targets, an element of differentiation still remains in their compensation 
contracts. Since a high level of cash compensation can be associated with increased managerial 
entrenchment and risk aversion (Berger et al., 1997), acquiring managers of non-public targets 
are likely to make less risky acquisitions than their counterparts who acquire publicly listed 
firms. 
6.2 Target Status, Deal Performance and Managerial Incentives 
6.2.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 compares short and long-run stock-price performance between bidders of 
public and non-public deals. Acquisition announcement returns are measured by CARs(-5,+5) 
which is calculated as the bidder's cumulative abnormal returns over an eleven-day window 
around the acquisition announcement date using the market model. The estimation period is 
from 200 days to 60 days preceding the acquisition announcement date. The CRSP value-
weighted index is used for the calculation of market returns in line with previous studies13. If 
a firm has made more than one acquisition announcements at the same date, only the first one 
is included in the calculation of CARs(-5,+5) in order to maintain independence of 
observations. Outliers at the 1 percent and 99 percent percentiles are also excluded from the 
analysis14. In line with previous research findings, the results show that the market reacts more 
positively to acquisition announcements of non-public targets (Fuller et al., 2002; Draper and 
Paudyal, 2006; Officer et al., 2007). Acquirers of public targets experience significantly lower 
mean (-2.01 percent) and median (-1.60 percent) announcement returns than bidders for non-
public targets. Moreover, acquirers’ CARs in public deals are negative and statistically 
significant whereas acquirers of non-public targets earn significantly positive announcement 
returns. All results are significant at the 1 percent level. 
                                                          
13 See for example, Antoniou et al. (2008), Golubov et at. (2012), Alexandridis et al. (2013). 
14 The results remain identical if outliers are not excluded from the analysis. 
Acquirer’s long-run post-acquisition stock-price performance is measured by the 3-year 
abnormal buy-and-hold return. 3yABHR is calculated as the bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold 
return following the acquisition effective date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold return of the non-
acquiring matched firm for the same period. The matching criteria are similar to those described 
in Section 5.2. Similarly to the methodology followed in the calculation of CARs, only the first 
deal is included when a bidder makes more than one acquisitions on the same date. Outliers 
at the 1 percent and 99 percent percentiles are also excluded from the analysis15.  Table 4 shows 
that acquirers of public targets also underperform in the long-run in line with the evidence 
provided by prior studies (Andrade et al., 2001; Conn et al., 2005). The average (median) 3-
year ABHR is lower by 6.6 percent (6.5 percent) for acquirers of public firms compared to 
acquirers of non-public targets. In addition, acquirers of non-public targets experience positive 
and statistically significant (at the one percent level) long-term returns while the average and 
median 3-year ABHR of public deal bidders are not statistically different than zero at the 1 and 
5 percent levels.  
The (univariate) results so far show that acquirers of public targets experience 
significantly inferior short-run and long-run stock price performance confirming previous 
relative research that acquisitions of publicly listed firms destroy value for acquiring 
shareholders. However, Table 3 shows that managers who acquire public firms are not provided 
with significantly different equity-related incentives relative to managers that acquire non-
public targets. Whether these compensation contracts have different impact on the quality of 
public and non-public deals will be tested in a multivariate setting in the next Section. 
                                                          
15 The results do not change when these criteria are dropped. 
6.2.2 Acquisition Announcement Returns 
Table 5 presents the results of multivariate OLS regressions of acquirer’s CARs on 
executive compensation16 and other firm and deal characteristics. The dependent variable is the 
bidder’s eleven-day (-5,+5) cumulative abnormal return around the announcement date. Apart 
from firm-specific characteristics that were discussed earlier, we also control for the method of 
payment as there is empirical evidence that bidders experience lower returns when they finance 
their acquisition with equity (Travlos, 1987) which can be due to signalling of assets 
overvaluation when managers choose to finance investments by equity (Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  Furthermore, it has been documented that diversifying acquisitions are associated with 
negative abnormal returns around the announcement date (Morck et al., 1990; Cornett et al., 
2003). To capture the impact of diversifying deals on bidder’s performance, we use the dummy 
variable Diversifying that takes the value of one if the acquirer and the target operate in different 
industries and zero otherwise17. All multivariate models hereupon include industry and year 
fixed effects to control for industry-specific factors and merger waves over time (Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996; Zhao, 2013). In addition, in all multivariate tests we use heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at firm-level due to the fact that a number of firms have made 
several acquisitions in our sample.    
Model 1 of Table 5 shows the results for the full-sample while Models 2, 3 and 4 present 
the regression estimates when the target is a public, private and subsidiary firm respectively. 
Higher pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) is positively related to acquisition announcement 
returns when the target is a privately held (Model 3) or subsidiary firm (Model 4) confirming 
the findings of Datta et al. (2001) that acquisitions made by managers with higher levels of 
                                                          
16 In line with previous studies (i.e. Coles et al., 2006), Delta and Vega are entered in million dollars in the 
multivariate regressions.  
17 Industries are defined based on the Fama and French (1997) classification of 48 industries. In 17 cases that the 
target’s industry is not identified in the 48 industries classification of Fama and French (1997), industries are 
defined based on the 2-digit SIC code. 
equity-based compensation are perceived more positively by the market. However, no such 
relation is observed in public deals indicating that equity-based incentives provided to 
acquiring managers of public targets fail to create value for acquiring shareholders in the 
acquisition announcement period. The economically and statistically significant coefficient of 
the Public dummy in Model 1 is consistent with the results of the univariate analysis showing 
that public deals experience significantly lower announcement returns than non-pubic deals. 
The remaining control variables are according to expectations based on the extant 
literature. Acquirer’s size is negatively related to acquisition announcement returns (Moeller 
et al., 2004) and so is the relatively size of the deal (Travlos, 1987) in public deals. On the other 
hand, the relative size if found to be positively associated with announcement returns when a 
privately-held firm is acquired (Asquith et al., 1983). The market also appears to perceive more 
positively acquisitions financed by cash as documented by Travlos (1987) and Datta et al. 
(2001). Past stock price performance (Runup) is negatively related to investors’ reaction to deal 
announcement in all models in line with Jensen’s (1988) hypothesis that corporate acquisitions 
can be driven by managerial hubris. 
Model 5 introduces interaction terms between the target status dummies and the method 
of payment dummies in order to capture the effect of target status on announcement returns 
under different payment methods for the total sample. The interaction of target legal status and 
the method of payment has been identified as important by the literature (Fuller et al., 2002, 
Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Masulis et al., 2007; Golubov et al., 2012). Cont_Equity is a dummy 
variable that take the value of one if the method of financing includes equity and zero 
otherwise. All other dummy variables are as defined previously and described in the Appendix. 
The only interaction term that appears to have good explanatory power is that between public 
deals and equity financing. The coefficient of this term is negative and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level confirming the findings of previous studies that public deals are associated 
with lower abnormal returns (Travlos, 1987; Draper and Paudyal, 2006) when they are not 
financed with cash. It also explains further the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of the Payment_Cash variable in Models 1 and 2. 
6.2.3 Synergy Gains 
 As a robustness test of the relation between short-term deal performance and 
managerial incentives, we also measure synergy gains accrued from the deal around the 
announcement date. If an acquirer overpays for a target it usually reallocates wealth between 
the two firms. When the shareholders of the acquiring firm are well-diversified, they shouldn’t 
be affected by overpayment. However, an acquisition that reduces the total value of both the 
acquiring and target firms makes shareholders worse off even if they are diversified (Moeller 
et al., 2004). Table 6 examines whether the structure of executive compensation of the 
acquiring firm affects the synergy gains from acquisitions. The table considers only public 
deals as the calculation of synergy gains requires the availability of stock price data for both 
the bidder and the target.  
The dependent variable in the first model of Table 6, Synergy_Gains, measures the total 
dollar value of synergies resulted from the transaction. Following Kale et al. (2003) and 
Golubov et al. (2012), Synergy_Gains is calculated as the sum of dollar-denominated gains for 
the bidder and the target. Dollar-denominated gains are defined as the market value of equity 
4 weeks before the announcement date times the cumulated abnormal return over the 5-day 
window surrounding the announcement date (-2,+2)18 for each firm. Model specification 
follow Golubov et al. (2012). The results show no statistically significant relation between 
                                                          
18 When synergies are calculated based on the method of Bradley et al. (1988) using an 11-day window (-5,+5) 
the results do not change. 
incentive compensation and synergy gains suggesting that pay-performance and pay-risk 
sensitivity cannot affect acquisition synergies in public deals. In other words, providing higher 
equity-related incentives to managers who acquire public firms does not increase the combined 
value of the bidder and the target relative to their values as independent entities. 
The dependent variable in the second model of Table 6, Bidder's_Gains, measures the 
percentage of synergy gains accrued to the shareholders of the acquiring firm. Similar to Kale 
et al. (2003) and Golubov et al. (2012), Bidder's_Gains is calculated as the dollar-denominated 
gain for the bidder divided by Synergy_Gains when Synergy_Gains is positive. When 
Synergy_Gains is negative, Bidder’s_Gains is calculated as 1 minus the dollar-denominated 
gain for the bidder divided by Synergy_Gains. Model 2 shows that when the target is a publicly 
listed firm, incentive compensation is an inefficient mechanism of increasing shareholders 
value in the short-run. The findings are also in line with the results of the previous section that 
bidder’s shareholders are better off when the transaction is financed entirely by cash. Overall, 
the empirical results of Tables 5 and 6 provide support to H1 with regard to the short-run 
financial performance of the deal.  The next two sections test our first hypothesis when the 
long-run performance of the deal is taken into consideration. 
6.2.4 Long-Run Post-Acquisition Stock Price Performance 
The calculation of both bidder’s announcement returns and synergy gains are based on 
the estimation of cumulative abnormal returns for an event window surrounding the acquisition 
announcement date. However, the market reaction around the acquisition announcement date 
can be an insufficient statistic with respect to the wealth effect of the transaction (Harford and 
Li, 2007). The market may react negatively to an acquisition that can actually create value for 
acquiring shareholders in the long-run and vice versa. For instance, while the market tends to 
react negatively to stock deals (Travlos, 1987), acquiring shareholders may be benefited in the 
long-run if acquiring managers use overvalued stock to acquire a relatively less overvalued 
target (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Other reasons may also be related to market inefficiencies 
such as the presence of information asymmetry and irrational investors’ expectations. In 
addition, the evaluation of the effectiveness of incentive compensation cannot be limited to the 
announcement effect of the deal. Such an approach would imply that the incentives offered to 
managers via their compensation contracts make them focus on the myopic, short-term effects 
of their decisions.  In contrast, equity-related compensation should be structured in such a way 
so that executives’ wealth be tied to the firm’s future stock price performance. The examination 
of the long-term impact of executives’ decisions on firm performance is thus of (at least) equal 
importance in estimating the effectiveness of incentive compensation. 
Table 7 presents the estimates of multivariate regressions that explain acquirer’s long-
run stock-price performance. Since not all acquiring firms survive for three years following the 
acquisition, we control for selection bias using Heckman (1979) two-step selection model. The 
dependent variable for the probit regressions (columns titled “Selection”) is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the acquirer survives for three years following the acquisition 
effective date and zero otherwise. The model requires the use of an instrumental variable in the 
first-stage equation that would not appear in the second-stage equation. In addition, this 
variable should be related to the likelihood of the company surviving in the post-acquisition 
long-run period but should not affect long-run performance as the latter is measured in the 
second stage regression (columns titled “3yABHR”). The selected variable, Months_Surv., 
measures the number of months the acquiring firm has survived since its first acquisition during 
an extended period between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 2010. If the company has not 
made another acquisition in the past, the variable takes the value of zero. The difference 
between the number of total and uncensored observations (for instance, 1,167 for the total 
sample) indicate the number of bidders that are either delisted or don’t survive as independent 
entities for three years following the transaction. The dependent variable in the second-stage 
regression is our measure of three-year abnormal buy-and-hold return (3yABHR) as defined 
earlier in the paper (Section 6.2.1). 
The first model in Table 7 shows that when the total sample is taken into consideration 
a higher Delta increases the likelihood of surviving three years following the acquisition and 
that both the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price change (Delta) and stock return 
volatility (Vega) are positively and significantly related to long-run stock price performance 
following acquisitions. The results are in line with previous research findings that aligning the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders via incentive compensation contracts improves 
bidders’ long-run performance following corporate acquisitions (Datta et al., 2001; Minnick et 
al., 2011). The signs of the remaining variables are according to expectations. Large acquirers 
appear to destroy value in acquisitions (Moeller at al., 2004) and the use of cash as method of 
payment benefits acquiring shareholders in the long-run, in line with the findings of the short-
term analysis. Superior past stock-price performance and high cash holdings are associated 
with bidder’s underperformance in the long-run confirming Jensen’s (1988) free cash flow 
hypothesis and the findings of Harford (1999) and Rosen (2006). 
In line with the approach followed for the examination of the relation between executive 
compensation and acquisition announcement returns, Models 2, 3 and 4 present the results for 
public, private and subsidiary deals respectively. The regressions’ estimates show that better 
incentivised managers make value increasing acquisitions when private or subsidiary firms are 
acquired but not when the target is a publicly listed firm. The coefficient of Delta is positive 
and statistically significant in both private and subsidiary deals subsamples (Models 3 and 4) 
and Vega is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level in private deals (Model 
3). In contrast, none of the incentive compensation measures are important in the subsample of 
public acquisitions (Model 2). The results indicate that incentive compensation cannot 
effectively align the interests of managers with those of shareholders in the long-run when a 
publicly listed firm is acquired confirming our earlier predictions.  
Model 5 of Table 7 confirms the findings of Model 1 that pay-performance (Delta) and 
pay-risk (Vega) sensitivity are positively associated with long-run stock price performance. 
The introduction of interaction terms of the method of payment and the target legal status shows 
that the payment method effect, which is evident in acquisition announcement returns (Table 
5), does not play an important role in explaining long-run deal performance once we control 
for the legal status of the target. Furthermore, the absence of statistical significance of the 
inverse Mills ratio in the majority of models (the only exception is Model 4 that examines long-
run performance of subsidiary deals) shows that selection bias is not a serious issue and the 
results remain largely free from such concerns. 
The results in Table 7 can possibly shed some light into the documented 
underperformance of public deals as incentive compensation appears to be ineffective in 
inducing value-increasing behaviour in such type of transactions in the long-run. Along with 
our findings that acquiring managers of public targets are not provided with significantly 
different equity-related incentives relative to the acquiring managers of non-public targets 
(Table 3), our long-run results add to our findings in the previous section confirming our 
predictions in H1 that incentive compensation has a positive impact on deal performance only 
when a non-publicly listed firm is acquired. In public deals, acquiring managers appear to 
perceive differently the same equity-related incentives compared to their counterparts who 
acquire private or subsidiary firms. 
6.2.5 Propensity Score Matching  
Although the analysis in Table 7 is expected to address selection bias concerns, it is 
also possible that acquisitions of public targets are deals with quite different characteristics 
than acquisitions of non-publicly listed firms. To address such endogeneity concerns, we re-
examine the relation between long-run deal performance and managerial incentives using a 
propensity-score matching (PSM) approach similar to that followed in several other studies 
(Duchin and Schmidt, 2013; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Ghaly et al., 2015).  The dependent 
variable, 3yABHR_PSM is now calculated as the 3-year daily buy-and-hold return of the 
acquiring firm following the acquisition effective date minus the 3-year daily buy-and-hold 
return of the propensity-score matched firm over the same period. Propensity scores are 
estimated using Harford’s (1999) model to predict bidders. The model is estimated separately 
for each year in our sample and each acquirer is matched to a non-acquirer19 with the closest 
propensity score in the same industry-year. Similarly to our covariate-matching approach in 
Sections 5.2, 6.2 and 6.2.4, matched firms that are delisted before the completion of the 3-year 
post-acquisition period are replaced with the next closest match on the delisting date.20  
Table 8 presents the results. Model 1 confirms our earlier findings that pay-performance 
sensitivity (Delta) induces managers to make value-increasing acquisitions in the long-run, in 
line with the evidence provided by previous studies (Datta et al., 2001; Minnick et al., 2011; 
Lahlou and Navatte, 2017). However, partitioning our sample into acquisitions of public, 
private and subsidiary firms in Models 2, 3 and 4 respectively, shows that the positive relation 
between pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) and long-run stock-price performance is driven 
                                                          
19 The propensity-scored matched firm should not be involved in any acquisition activity for a 3-year period 
surrounding the acquisition effective date.  
20 From the total sample of 7,859 acquisitions, the calculation of propensity scores was possible for 6,291 deals 
which is reflected in the decreased number of observations in Table 8 relative to Table 7. From the 6,291 PSM 
deals, 813 acquirers are matched with two firms as the first matched firm is delisted before the passage of three 
years from the acquisition effective date. Similarly, 171 acquirers are matched with three firms and 37 acquirers 
are matched with four firms with the closest propensity score. 
by acquisitions of privately held firms. In contrast, incentive compensation does not appear to 
induce value-increasing decisions in the long-run when a publicly listed firm is acquired. 
Collectively, our empirical findings from sections 6.2.2 – 6.2.5 provide strong support to H1. 
Our results show that equity-based incentives provided to acquiring managers via their 
compensation contracts cannot benefit acquiring shareholders neither in the short or long-run 
when the target is a publicly listed firm. Our analysis indicates that the documented 
underperformance of public deals relative to acquisitions of private firms can, at least partially, 
be explained by the inefficiency of incentive compensation to induce value-increasing 
behaviour in such type of corporate takeovers. 
6.3 Target Status, Riskiness of Acquisitions and Managerial Incentives 
Following the evidence provided by the preceding analysis about the relation between 
incentive compensation and deal performance subject to the status of the target firm, this 
section examines differences in the riskiness between public and non-public deals and whether 
such differences can be explained by managerial incentives in order to test H2. We use two 
measures of acquisition risk to capture the change in the volatility of bidders’ stock returns 
between the period preceding and the period following the transaction. The first measure, 
D_Risk, is calculated as the difference between the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock 
returns for 6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and the standard deviation 
of acquirer’s stock returns for 6 months preceding the effective date (-126 to -1 days). A 
positive value indicates an increase in firm risk after the acquisition while a negative value 
means that the volatility of stock returns has fallen following the transaction. To test the 
robustness of our results, a second firm risk variable is constructed. Following Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) and Kravet (2014), D_Risk_AbR measures the change in the standard 
deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock returns for a period of 6 months following the 
acquisition effective date (+60 to +185 days) minus a 6-month period preceding the acquisition 
announcement date (-185 to -60 days). The pre-acquisition period ends 60 trading days before 
the announcement date and the post-acquisition period begins 60 trading days after the effective 
date in order to minimise the impact of acquisition negotiation and completion periods on stock 
returns (Kravet, 2014). Abnormal stock returns are calculated as the residual from the market 
model using the CRSP value-weighted index. 
Table 9 presents differences in means and medians for both measures of acquisition 
risk between public and non-public deals. Being risky decisions per se, corporate acquisitions 
are associated with an increase in stock return volatility in both types of deals. The results show 
that acquisitions of public targets increase the volatility of the acquiring firm’s stock returns 
significantly more than acquisitions of non-public targets. According to our first measure of 
acquisition risk, D_Risk, acquiring a publicly listed firm leads to an average (median) increase 
in stock return volatility of 14.31 percent (3.38 percent) relative to only 7.25 percent (-0.40 
percent) when a non-public firm is acquired. Similarly, the average (median) increase in the 
volatility of acquirer’s abnormal returns is 20.14 percent (11.06 percent) following the 
acquisition of a public firm compared to 12.66 percent (3.18 percent) when the target is a non-
public firm. The differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both means 
and medians and for both measures of risk. The lower volatility of non-public deals can be 
partly attributed to the fact that information can be disclosed more efficiently between the 
bidder and target shareholders in private deals (Conn et al.; 2005) making such type of deals 
less risky. Furthermore, as shown in Section 6.2, acquirers of non-public firms receive higher 
proportions of cash compensation that is associated with higher risk aversion (Berger et al., 
1997). The remaining of the section examines whether such differences in acquisition risk can 
be explained by the responsiveness of managers to risk-taking incentives.  
Tables 10-11 examine the relation between the change in the volatility of bidder’s stock 
returns and managerial incentives in a multivariate setting. To address concerns of endogeneity 
regarding the relation between executive compensation and the riskiness of acquisition 
decisions, we use systems of simultaneous equations (3SLS regressions) in accordance with 
the commonly approved method in previous relative studies (Rogers 2012; Coles et al., 2006; 
Cohen et al., 2013; Croci and Petmezas, 2015). A three-stage-least-squares (3SLS) model is 
used since it shows higher consistency and efficiency than the 2SLS asymptotically (Cohen et 
al., 2013). Model specifications as well as the determinants of Delta and Vega used in the 
analysis are also similar to those of previous relative research (Coles et al., 2006, Cohen et al., 
2013, Croci and Petmezas, 2015). Furthermore, in line with the common approach in 3SLS, 
we use contemporaneous21 rather than lagged values of the variables included in the system of 
simultaneous equations. 
Table 10 presents the results for the first measure of acquisition risk. The jointly 
determined (endogenous) variables are the change in the volatility of acquirer’s stock returns, 
D_Riskc, the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock-price changes, Deltac, and the sensitivity 
of managers’ wealth to stock return volatility, Vegac. Panel A shows the estimates of 3SLS 
regressions when a publicly listed firm is acquired. Confirming the findings of previous studies, 
the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock-price performance (Deltac) and cash compensation 
(Cash_Compc) are negatively related to firm risk (Berger et al., 1997; Billett et al., 2010; Chava 
and Purnanandam, 2010; Cohen et al., 2013). In contrast, pay-risk sensitivity (Vegac), which is 
expected to induce risk-taking (Coles et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2013; Croci and Petmezas, 
2015) has a positive but not statistically significant impact when the analysis is confined to 
public deals. Furthermore, Vegac is not found to be significantly related to other corporate 
                                                          
21 Denoted by the exponential symbol “c” 
investments (R&D, PPE and CAPEX) when the incentives of public deals acquiring managers 
are examined.  
The results in Panel B of Table 10 indicate that the sensitivity of managerial wealth to 
the volatility of stock returns (Vega) is effective in inducing risk-taking when non-public firms 
are acquired. The coefficient of Vegac is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level confirming the findings of previous studies (Coles et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2013; Croci 
and Petmezas, 2015). In contrast, cash compensation (Cash_Compc) and pay-performance 
sensitivity (Deltac) are negatively related to the riskiness of acquisitions decisions. In line with 
the relative literature, Vegac is now also positively related to R&D expenditures that increase 
firm risk (Nam et al., 2003; Coles at al., 2006) and negatively related to less risky investments 
such as property, plant and equipment. Moreover, the results show a strong and positive relation 
between Deltac and Vegac which justifies the choice to control for Deltac when Vegac is used 
as the dependent variable and vice versa. A positive and significant relation between firm size 
and the dollar value of managerial incentives is also found in both panels A and B in line with 
the previously documented positive association between firm size and executive compensation 
(Bliss and Rosen, 2001). The results add to the findings of the previous section according to 
which equity-related incentives are rendered inefficient to serve their intended objectives when 
a publicly listed firm is acquired. More specifically, pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) is 
found to be positively related to stock-price performance only in non-public deals (private and 
subsidiary deals). Similarly, pay-risk sensitivity (Vega) is found to induce risk-taking activity 
in corporate acquisitions only when the target firm is a non-publicly listed firm.  
As a robustness check, the analysis of the system of simultaneous equations is repeated 
for the second risk measure (D_Risk_AbR) in Table 11. Confirming the findings of Table 10, 
the higher riskiness of public deals is not found to be related to the incentives managers are 
provided with via their compensation contracts (Panel A). The coefficients of both Deltac and 
Vegac are statistically unimportant at conventional significance levels in Panel A. In contrast, 
managerial incentives work according to expectations when a non-public firm is acquired 
(Panel B). In the latter case, Vegac is positive and both economically and statistically significant 
(at the 1 percent level) in explaining changes in the volatility of abnormal stock returns whereas 
Deltac and cash compensation are negatively related to the riskiness of the acquisition. Overall, 
the findings from Tables 10 and 11 confirm the predictions of H2. 
7. Conclusion 
Using an extended sample of U.S. mergers and acquisitions over an 18-year period 
(1993-2010) we provide new evidence about the relation of incentive compensation and 
bidding firm risk and performance. Higher sensitivity of acquiring managers’ wealth to stock 
price changes, Delta, is positively related to short and long-run stock-price performance if the 
target is a non-public firm. Similarly, higher sensitivity of acquiring managers’ wealth to stock 
return volatility, Vega, is found to mitigate risk aversion and lead to riskier corporate 
acquisitions when the target is a non-publicly listed firm. In contrast, managerial incentives do 
not seem to work according to their intended objectives in public deals.  
Although managers of firms that acquire public targets are not found to receive 
significantly different equity-related incentives than acquiring managers who make non-public 
deals, they underperform their counterparts both in the short and long-run. Confirming previous 
research, we find that bidders of public deals experience significantly negative announcement 
returns and lower long-run returns than bidders of non-public deals. We contribute to the 
literature showing that the documented underperformance of public deals can, at least partially, 
be explained by the inefficiency of incentive compensation to induce value-increasing 
decisions both in the short and long-run in such type of deals. Examining the relation between 
the riskiness of acquisitions decisions and pay-risk sensitivity leads to similar conclusions with 
regard to the effectiveness of incentive compensation in public deals. The risk-increasing 
behaviour of acquiring managers in public deals is not found to be driven by risk-taking 
incentives provided to them via their compensation contracts. One possible explanation is that 
the positive relation between incentive compensation and value-increasing decisions is offset 
by the increased bargaining power of public targets (Officer, 2007). Incentive compensation 
can also be more effective in non-public deals due to the mitigation of information asymmetry 
and managerial hubris. As noted by Conn et al. (2005), acquiring managers are able to disclose 
private information more efficiently to the concentrated shareholders of a private target and 
they may be more willing to discontinue negotiations when it is strategically correct to do so 
due to the lack of publicity surrounding private deals. 
Our findings have important implications for market participants and create new scope 
for future research in the areas of M&As and executive compensation. It is possible that 
acquisitions of public targets are deals with different characteristics than acquisitions of non-
public firms. However, our results show that remuneration committees provide the same level 
of incentive compensation to acquiring managers in both types of deals following an “one size 
fits all” approach.  Since the current level of sensitivity of managers’ wealth to stock price 
volatility and performance cannot create value for acquiring shareholders in public deals, it 
would be useful to identify which structure of executive compensation could maximise 
shareholders’ value in such type of deals while minimising associated costs. The latter would 
benefit significantly both bidding firms’ shareholders and independent compensation 
committees given the potentially high cost of equity-based compensation. Moreover, it could 
also be useful to investigate the structure of executive compensation of target’s managers in 
public deals and examine whether equity-related incentives provided to target’s executives 
contradict or even offset those provided to the managers of the bidding firm. 
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Table 1: Distribution of M&As, Deal Size, Target Status and Method of Payment 
The table presents the distribution of 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to 
December 31, 2010. Relative Size is the deal value as reported by SDC Platinum scaled by the bidder’s market 
capitalisation value from CRSP. Public Deals shows the number of transactions where the target is a publicly 
listed firm. Private Deals shows the number of transactions where the target is a private firm. Subsidiary Deals 
shows the number of transactions where the target is a subsidiary firm. Payment Cash shows the number of 
transactions that are financed entirely by cash. Payment Equity shows the number of transactions that are financed 
entirely by stock. Mixed Financing shows the number of transactions that are financed by a mix of cash, equity, 





















                   
1993 319 4.1% 0.10 67 132 119 119 117 83 
1994 354 4.5% 0.11 92 141 117 151 116 87 
1995 351 4.5% 0.14 106 135 105 135 126 90 
1996 466 5.9% 0.14 122 204 132 180 158 128 
1997 542 6.9% 0.15 153 221 163 192 198 152 
1998 583 7.4% 0.14 183 246 150 220 207 156 
1999 593 7.5% 0.13 195 230 165 260 184 149 
2000 534 6.8% 0.14 152 233 145 217 155 162 
2001 429 5.5% 0.11 119 166 139 218 66 145 
2002 448 5.7% 0.08 77 189 176 244 35 169 
2003 461 5.9% 0.10 85 192 180 284 30 147 
2004 482 6.1% 0.13 89 232 157 290 30 162 
2005 476 6.1% 0.10 89 251 132 286 17 173 
2006 446 5.7% 0.11 91 192 160 308 19 119 
2007 471 6.0% 0.11 102 244 124 307 12 152 
2008 358 4.6% 0.11 66 170 120 242 13 103 
2009 261 3.3% 0.12 52 111 91 164 12 85 
2010 285 3.6% 0.10 47 141 94 217 5 63 
          








Table 2: Summary Statistics 
The table presents summary statistics for the sample of 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions from SDC Platinum 
over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp, 
stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. Delta is the dollar change in the wealth of top 
five executives for one percent change in firm’s stock price. Vega is the dollar change in the wealth of top five 
executives for one percent change in the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns. Cash_Comp is the sum of 
salary and bonus payments to the top five executives from ExecuComp. Total_Comp is the sum of top five 
executives’ salary, bonus, new stock and option grants and other forms of compensation from ExecuComp. 











        
Compensation Variables 
(‘000s’)        
Delta 3,099 26,338 210 598 1,685 7,599 
Vega 440 939 46 130 399 7,599 
Cash_Comp 4,814 6,681 2,228 3,377 5,499 7,859 
Total_Comp 16,990 27,595 4,503 8,588 18,240 7,859 
        
Firm Characteristics        
Size 14.884 1.645 13.670 14.670 15.910 7,859 
Runup 0.043 0.823 -0.218 0.036 0.310 7,829 
Leverage 0.228 0.168 0.096 0.211 0.331 6,937 
Cash/Assets 0.154 0.179 0.026 0.076 0.225 7,821 
B/M 0.592 0.282 0.730 0.590 0.820 7,799 
ROA 0.132 0.105 0.064 0.131 0.191 7,854 
Sales_Growth 0.065 0.124 0.004 0.045 0.106 7,708 
Sigma 0.016 0.012 0.008 0.013 0.021 7,859 
R&D 0.034 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.049 7,859 
Net_PPE 0.206 0.219 0.045 0.133 0.284 7,713 
CAPEX 0.046 0.058 0.010 0.030 0.060 7,713 
CEO_Tenure 100 125 33 68 126 7,349 








Table 3: Difference in Executive Compensation between Acquirers of Public and Non-Public Targets 
The table presents differences in average compensation characteristics of acquiring managers between public and 
non-public deals. The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 
31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Data on executive compensation are from ExecuComp. Delta is the dollar change 
in the wealth of top five executives for a one percent change in firm’s stock price. Vega is the dollar change in the 
wealth of top five executives for a one percent change in the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns. 
Cash_Comp is the sum of salary and bonus payments to the top five executives. Total_Comp is the sum of top 
five executives’ salary, bonus, new stock and option grants and other forms of compensation. Transactions are 
classified as public deals when a publicly-listed firm is acquired, otherwise they are characterised as non-public 
deals. t-statistics are from the t-test for difference in means. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 









Delta 4,768.62 2,561.62  2,207.00** 
2.28 
Observations 1,852 5,747   
     
Vega 544.69 406.35 138.34*** 5.28 
Observations 1,852 5,747   
     
Cash_Comp 5,769.79 4,512.39 1,257.40*** 7.95 
Observations 1,887 5,972   
          









Delta 0.389 0.256 0.133 
0.75 
Observations 1,852 5,747   
     
Vega 0.024 0.022 0.001 1.52 
Observations 1,852 5,747   
     
Cash_Comp 0.444 0.469 -0.025*** -3.75 
Observations 1,887 5,972   










Table 4: Difference in Performance between Public and Non-Public Deals 
The table presents differences in deal performance between acquirers of public and non-public targets. The sample 
is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Stock price data are from CRSP. CARs(-5,+5) is the bidder's cumulative abnormal return over an eleven-day event 
window (-5, +5) where 0 is the announcement date using the market model. The estimation period is from 200 
days to 60 days before the acquisition announcement. 3yABHR is the bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily return 
following the acquisition effective date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold daily return of the matched firm for the 
same period. Transactions are classified as public deals when a publicly-listed firm is acquired, otherwise they 
are characterised as non-public deals. t-statistics are from the t-test for difference in means and z-statistics are 
from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the respective distributions. ***, **, and * indicate 









CARs(-5,+5) %     
Mean -1.479*** 0.529*** -2.008*** -9.55 
Median -1.198*** 0.400*** -1.598*** -9.92 
Observations 1,847 5,785   
     
3yABHR %     
Mean -2.497 4.096*** -6.594** -2.45 
Median -3.425* 3.110*** -6.535*** -3.25 



















Table 5: Acquisition Announcement Returns, Target Status and Managerial Incentives 
The table presents multivariate regression estimates of bidder’s eleven-day CARs (-5,+5) on executive 
compensation and other firm and deal characteristics. The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the 
period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. CARs(-5,+5) is the bidder's cumulative 
abnormal return over an eleven-day event window (-5, +5) where 0 is the announcement date using the market 
model. The estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the acquisition announcement. Definitions of the 
independent variables are as described in the Appendix. Transactions are classified as public deals when a 
publicly-listed firm is acquired, as private deals when a privately-held firm is acquired and as subsidiary deals 
when a subsidiary firm is acquired. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at firm-level standard 












       
Intercept 9.3266*** 6.0459 8.5854*** 7.3154*** 9.2214*** 
 (5.87) (1.54) (2.81) (2.68) (5.77) 
Delta 0.0009 -0.0035 0.0031* 0.0190* 0.0009 
 (0.46) (-1.28) (1.75) (1.69) (0.52) 
Vega 0.1441 0.1677 0.1510 -0.0433 0.1181 
 (1.36) (0.83) (0.80) (-0.20) (1.12) 
Cash_Comp 0.0380** 0.0092 0.0483* 0.0255 0.0367** 
 (2.19) (0.24) (1.89) (1.25) (2.21) 
Size -0.4659*** -0.3130* -0.5023*** -0.3916*** -0.4664*** 
 (-5.31) (-1.68) (-3.58) (-2.66) (-5.34) 
Payment_Cash 0.4131* 1.6394*** 0.1236 0.3842            
 (1.96) (3.73) (0.37) (0.97)            
Diversifying -0.0331 -0.6455 0.3417 -0.0251 -0.0536 
 (-0.16) (-1.29) (1.02) (-0.07) (-0.26) 
Runup -0.9107*** -0.9648*** -0.7387*** -1.3797*** -0.9082*** 
 (-5.57) (-3.19) (-3.66) (-4.64) (-5.52) 
Cash/Assets -0.3801 -1.1622 -0.1795 -0.7325 -0.4072 
 (-0.49) (-0.60) (-0.16) (-0.52) (-0.52) 
Public * Payment_Cash      -0.2519 
      (-0.62) 
Public * Contain_Equity      -2.2726*** 
      (-6.58) 
Private * Payment_Cash      -0.1497 
      (-0.48) 
Private * Conatin_Equity      -0.1891 
      (-0.55) 
Subsidiary * Payment_Cash      0.2912 
      (0.97) 
Public -1.6558***               
 (-5.93)               
Private -0.3156               
 (-1.36)               
Relative_Size -0.6516 -2.2655*** 2.6743** 1.3703 -0.5150 
 (-1.23) (-3.21) (1.97) (1.26) (-0.96) 
BM -0.2172 -0.7204 -0.0011 -0.4978 -0.2403 
 (-0.40) (-0.54) (-0.00) (-0.50) (-0.44) 
       
Number of Observations 7,292 1,799 3,146 2,282 7,292 
F-Statistic 4.11*** 1.84*** 1.85*** 6.81*** 4.18*** 
R-Squared 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 




Table 6: Synergy Gains, Target Status and Managerial Incentives 
The table presents multivariate regression estimates of synergy gains on executive compensation and other firm 
and deal characteristics. The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to 
December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Synergy_Gains is the sum of dollar-denominated gains for the bidder 
and the target. Dollar-denominated gains are defined as the market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement date times the CAR (-2,+2) for each firm. Bidder’s_Gians measures the bidder’s share of synergies 
and is calculated as the dollar-denominated gains for the bidder divided by Synergy_Gains if the latter is positive 
and 1- dollar-denominated gains for the bidder divided by Synergy_Gains otherwise. t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at firm-level standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 








Intercept 2622.5590 -2.4867 
 (1.60) (-0.82) 
Delta 2.3395 0.0050 
 (0.25) (0.61) 
Vega 330.6291 -0.2738 
 (0.74) (-0.64) 
Cash_Comp -10.0750 -0.0091 
 (-0.24) (-0.46) 
Size -106.5279 0.1516 
 (-1.01) (0.88) 
Payment_Cash 68.1965 1.0598*** 
 (0.38) (3.24) 
Diversifying -197.6021 0.3789 
 (-1.11) (1.22) 
Runup -179.8838 -0.0122 
 (-1.51) (-0.09) 
Sigma -3019.4030 7.5242 
 (-0.15) (0.26) 
Hostile 89.1978 0.4597 
 (0.11) (0.87) 
Cash/Assets 330.8963 -0.9560 
 (0.44) (-0.44) 
Relative_Size -169.1889 -0.6143 
 (-0.95) (-1.30) 
B/M -219.2805 -1.6040 
 (-0.66) (-1.27) 
Leverage -60.9365 2.6763** 
 (-0.13) (2.02) 
   
Observations 1,444 1,444 
F-Statistic 0.74 6.56*** 
R-Squared 0.04 0.26 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry-fixed Effects YES YES 
 
Table 7: Long-Run Acquisition Performance, Target Status and Managerial Incentives 
The table presents the results of sample selection models following Heckman (1979) of acquisition long-run financial performance on executive compensation and other firm 
and deal characteristics. The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. The dependent variable 
for the first-stage regression in Heckman selection models is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquiring firm survives for three years after the acquisition effective date 
and zero otherwise. The dependent variable for the second-stage regression is 3yABHR which is the bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily return following the acquisition effective 
date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold daily return of the matched firm for the same period. Definitions of the independent variables are as described in the Appendix. Transactions 
are classified as public deals when a publicly-listed firm is acquired, as private deals when a privately-held firm is acquired and as subsidiary deals when a subsidiary firm is 
acquired. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at firm-level standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
Variable 
Model 1: Total Sample Model 2: Public Deals Model 3: Private Deals 
Model 4: Subsidiary 
Deals 
Model 5: Total Sample 
Selection 3yABHR Selection 3yABHR Selection 3yABHR Selection 3yABHR Selection 3yABHR 
Intercept -0.1716 0.3682 5.1412*** 0.4047 -0.5189 1.1618** 0.9674 -0.2953 -0.1892 0.3306 
 (-0.45) (1.16) (5.39) (0.74) (-0.70) (2.25) (1.57) (-0.63) (-0.49) (1.04) 
Delta 0.0124** 0.0009** 0.0448* 0.0003 0.0155 0.0013* 0.0105 0.0054** 0.0125** 0.0009** 
 (2.30) (2.12) (1.71) (0.60) (1.36) (1.94) (1.54) (1.97) (2.31) (2.13) 
Vega -0.0072 0.0403** 0.0425 0.0191 0.0042 0.0649*** -0.0757 -0.0463 -0.0085 0.0385** 
 (0.23) (2.56) (0.46) (0.64) (0.09) (2.84) (-1.43) (-1.16) (-0.27) (2.45) 
Cash_Comp -0.0090*** 0.0044** -0.0096 0.0117** -0.0058 0.0047 -0.0088** 0.0013 -0.0090*** 0.0043** 
 (-3.26) (2.04) (-0.92) (2.06) (-1.16) (1.43) (-2.31) (0.33) (-3.24) (1.99) 
Months_Surv. 0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0003  0.0013***  0.0003  
 (0.96)  (-0.22)  (-0.59)  (2.61)  (0.96)  
Size 0.1216*** -0.0524*** 0.1153*** -0.0553** 0.1554*** -0.0829*** 0.0613* -0.0226 0.1230*** -0.0498*** 
 (6.81) (-3.12) (2.74) (-2.09) (5.41) (-3.12) (1.91) (-0.87) (6.91) (-2.96) 
Payment_Cash 0.0131 0.0582** 0.0806 0.0764 0.0125 0.0659 -0.0789 -0.0165    
 (0.31) (2.12) (0.76) (1.29) (0.20) (1.63) (-0.95) (-0.28)    
Diversifying -0.0797* 0.0155 -0.2343** 0.0971 0.0513 0.0207 -0.1632** -0.0670 -0.0813* 0.0134 
 (-1.83) (0.54) (-2.25) (1.51) (0.77) (0.49) (-2.10) (-1.14) (-1.86) (0.47) 
Runup 0.0254 -0.0279* 0.0936* -0.0579 0.0227 -0.0219 -0.0313 -0.0320 0.0243 -0.0273* 
 (1.19) (-1.81) (1.80) (-1.56) (0.83) (-1.12) (-0.60) (-0.84) (1.14) (-1.77) 




Table 7 (Continued) 
Cash/Assets -0.8392*** -0.2282* -1.2897*** 0.0727 -0.7354*** -0.1969 -1.0379*** -0.6057** -0.8502*** -0.2363* 
 (-6.57) (-1.85) (-4.09) (0.31) (-4.16) (-1.26) (-4.07) (-2.36) (-6.65) (-1.91) 
Public * Payment_Cash             0.1542* 0.0580 
             (1.66) (1.05) 
Public * Contain_Equity             0.0323 -0.0711 
             (0.46) (-1.52) 
Private * Payment_Cash             0.0093 0.0253 
             (0.15) (0.63) 
Private * Conatin_Equity             0.0284 -0.0343 
             (0.44) (-0.78) 
Subsidiary * Payment_Cash             -0.0123 0.0364 
             (-0.20) (0.93) 
Public 0.0566 -0.0290             
 (0.98) (-0.79)             
Private -0.0086 -0.0326             
 (-0.18) (-1.07)             
Relative_Size -0.0449 -0.0067 -0.0985 0.0275 -0.1338 -0.1026 -0.1075 -0.0038 -0.0323 0.0065 
 (-0.56) (-0.12) (-0.80) (0.35) (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.77) (-0.03) (-0.40) (0.11) 
B/M -0.2505*** 0.0473 -0.3470 0.3127** -0.1542 -0.0143 -0.3642** -0.0640 -0.2432** 0.0485 
 (-2.62) (0.70) (-1.39) (2.10) (-1.11) (-0.15) (-2.11) (-0.49) (-2.54) (0.72) 
Inverse_Mills   0.1627   -0.4822   0.0124   0.9989**   0.1840 
   (0.54)   (-1.31)   (0.03)   (2.07)   (0.62) 
Total Observations 7,325   1,804   3,176   2,280   7,325   
Uncensored Observ.   6,158   1,528   2,631   1,943   6,158 
Wald Chi-Square 282.21*** 131.68*** 147.46*** 115.8*** 282.95*** 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Table 8: Propensity-Scored Matched Long-Run Stock-Price Returns, Target Status and Managerial 
Incentives 
The table presents multivariate regression results of acquisition long-run financial performance on CEO 
compensation and other firm and deal characteristics. The sample is 7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the 
period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. Data on executive compensation are from 
ExecuComp, stock price data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. The dependent variable, 
3yABHR_PSM, is the bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily return following the acquisition effective date minus the 
3-year buy-and-hold daily return of the propensity-scored matched firm for the same period. Propensity scores 
are estimated using Harford’s (1999) model to predict bidders. Definitions of the independent variables are as 
described in the Appendix. Transactions are classified as public deals when a publicly-listed firm is acquired, as 
private deals when a privately-held firm is acquired and as subsidiary deals when a subsidiary firm is acquired. t-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at firm-level standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, 













       
Intercept -0.2686 -1.0830* 0.0254 0.9567 -0.1839 
 (-0.43) (-1.87) (0.03) (1.02) (-0.30) 
Delta 0.0029*** 0.0016 0.0127*** -0.0031 0.0029*** 
 (2.66) (1.57) (3.07) (-0.73) (2.65) 
Vega 0.0297 -0.0016 0.0347 0.0994 0.0283 
 (1.10) (-0.05) (0.86) (1.32) (1.06) 
Cash_Comp 0.0007 -0.0027 -0.0006 0.0025 0.0007 
 (0.19) (-0.36) (-0.09) (0.95) (0.20) 
Size -0.0086 0.0368 -0.0249 -0.0559 -0.0096 
 (-0.33) (1.23) (-0.69) (-0.95) (-0.37) 
Payment_Cash -0.0016 0.0888 0.1146* -0.2345***  
 (-0.04) (1.22) (1.76) (-2.85)  
Diversifying 0.0682 0.1371* 0.0802 -0.0023 0.0672 
 (1.59) (1.82) (1.29) (-0.03) (1.56) 
Runup -0.0366 -0.0488 -0.0087 -0.0820 -0.0340 
 (-1.21) (-1.00) (-0.25) (-1.18) (-1.12) 
Cash/Assets -0.0209 0.2432 -0.2004 0.2275 -0.0243 
 (-0.08) (0.69) (-0.52) (0.61) (-0.10) 
Public * Payment_Cash      -0.0071 
      (-0.10) 
Public * Contain_Equity      -0.0851 
      (-1.24) 
Private * Payment_Cash      -0.0219 
      (-0.31) 
Private * Conatin_Equity      -0.1439* 
      (-1.95) 
Subsidiary * Payment_Cash      -0.1138* 
      (-1.78) 
Public -0.0177     
 (-0.30)     
Private -0.0296     
 (-0.51)     
Relative_Size 0.0841 0.1233 -0.0989 0.1572 0.0839 
 (0.88) (1.52) (-0.26) (0.85) (0.87) 
B/M 0.4593 0.1489 1.1399 -0.4297 0.4544 
 (0.94) (0.79) (1.15) (-1.48) (0.93) 
       
Number of Observations 5,268 1,381 2,118 1,723 5,268 
F-Statistic 2.41*** 2.05*** 2.24*** 1.53*** 2.44*** 
R-Squared 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.04 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Table 9: Difference in Riskiness between Public and Non-Public Deals 
The table presents differences in firm risk between acquisitions of public and non-public targets. The sample is 
7,859 completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Stock price data are from CRSP. D_Risk is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock returns between 
6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 months preceding the effective date (-126 to -1 
days). D_Risk_AbR is the change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock returns between 6 months 
following the effective date (+60 to +185 days) and 6 months preceding the acquisition announcement date (-185 
to -60 days). Abnormal stock returns are calculated as the residual from the market model using the CRSP value-
weighted index. Transactions are classified as public deals when a publicly-listed firm is acquired, otherwise they 
are characterised as non-public deals. t-statistics are from the t-test for difference in means and z-statistics are 
from the Wilcoxon rank sum test for difference between the respective distributions. ***, **, and * indicate 









D_Risk %     
Mean 14.310*** 7.254*** 7.056*** 2.79 
Median 3.380*** -0.400 3.780*** 2.98 
Observations 1,846 5,901   
     
D_Risk_AbR %     
Mean 20.142*** 12.661*** 7.481*** 2.60 
Median 11.060*** 3.180*** 7.880*** 3.68 


















Table 10: Volatility of Stock Returns, Target Status and Managerial Incentives 
The table presents simultaneous equations (3SLS) of acquiring firm risk, Vega and Delta. The sample is 7,859 
completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Executive compensation data are from ExecuComp and stock price data from CRSP. D_Risk is the change in the 
standard deviation of acquirer’s stock return between 6 months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 
6 months preceding the effective date (-126 to -1 days). Deltac is the dollar change in top five executives’ wealth 
for a one percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vegac is the dollar change in top five executives’ wealth for a 
one percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. Definitions of the independent variables 
are as described in the Appendix. The exponential symbol “c” denotes contemporaneous values (calculated for 
the year of the acquisition announcement). Transactions are classified as public deals when a publicly-listed firm 
is acquired, otherwise they are characterised as non-public deals. t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust, 
clustered at firm-level standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.  
Panel A: Public Deals 
Variable D_Risk Deltac Vegac 
Intercept 4.9079 -104.0753** -3.6785*** 
 (1.16) (-2.27) (-5.69) 
Deltac -0.06867*  0.0217*** 
 (-1.95)  (3.14) 
Vegac 1.9853 -8.3933  
 (1.60) (-0.98)  
Cash_Compc -0.0522*  0.0215*** 
 (-1.69)  (3.62) 
D_Risk   -15.6010** -0.2118 
   (-2.27) (-0.65) 
Size -0.3125 6.3318** 0.2312*** 
 (-1.19) (2.21) (6.53) 
Cash/Assetsc   12.8682*  
   (1.81)  
ROAc    -0.7461 
    (-1.53) 
Sales_Growthc 0.9191 10.6316  
 (1.53) (1.47)  
Leverage_Change 0.3093 8.9579 0.0561 
 (0.53) (1.01) (0.19) 
R&Dc   49.2501* 1.5825 
   (1.90) (1.54) 
Net_PPEc   -6.0772 0.0138 
   (-0.73) (0.06) 
CAPEXc   -33.0408 0.1466 
   (-1.26) (0.19) 
CEO_Tenure 0.0327 2.4288***  
 (0.68) (3.70)  
Observations 1,518 1,518 1,518 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES YES 




Table 10 (Continued) 
Panel B: Non-Public Deals 
Variable D_Risk Deltac Vegac 
Intercept 1.2196 -0.3194 -3.8543*** 
 (1.17) (-0.06) (-12.33) 
Deltac -0.0906**  0.0007 
 (-2.51)  (0.06) 
Vegac 0.9696*** 5.9625***  
 (2.73) (4.90)  
Cash_Compc -0.0105*  0.0149*** 
 (-1.89)  (5.53) 
D_Risk   -1.4211 -0.4323** 
   (-0.47) (-2.05) 
Size -0.0857 -0.0815 0.2799*** 
 (-1.20) (-0.21) (14.10) 
Cash/Assetsc   3.6681**  
   (2.29)  
ROAc    -0.5342*** 
    (-2.87) 
Sales_Growthc 1.1713*** 8.1816***  
 (3.39) (5.54)  
Leverage_Change 0.2297 1.3261 -0.0117 
 (1.12) (0.97) (-0.08) 
R&Dc   -3.0617 0.8621*** 
   (-0.83) (2.88) 
Net_PPEc   0.9185 -0.4391*** 
   (0.67) (-3.40) 
CAPEXc   1.7608 0.4599 
   (0.66) (1.33) 
CEO_Tenure 0.0448** 0.5274***  
 (1.99) (5.38)  
Observations 4,418 4,418 4,418 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES YES 








Table 11: Volatility of Abnormal Stock Returns, Target Status and Managerial Incentives 
The table presents simultaneous equations (3SLS) of acquisition riskiness, Vega and Delta. The sample is 7,859 
completed U.S. acquisitions over the period January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2010 from SDC Platinum. 
Executive compensation data are from ExecuComp and stock price data from CRSP. D_Risk_AbR is the change 
in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock returns between 6 months following the effective date (+60 
to +185 days) and 6 months preceding the acquisition announcement date (-185 to -60 days). Abnormal stock 
returns are calculated as the residual from the market model using the CRSP value-weighted index. Deltac is the 
dollar change in top five executives’ wealth for a one percent change in the firm’s stock price. Vegac is the dollar 
change in top five executives’ wealth for a one percent change in the standard deviation of the firm’s stock returns. 
Definitions of the independent variables are as described in the Appendix. The exponential symbol “c” denotes 
contemporaneous values (calculated for the year of the acquisition announcement). Transactions are classified as 
public deals when a publicly-listed firm is acquired, otherwise they are characterised as non-public deals. t-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust, clustered at firm-level standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Public Deals 
Variable D_Risk_AbR Deltac Vegac 
Intercept 3.7049 -173.2434* -4.2393*** 
 (1.06) (-1.82) (-4.89) 
Deltac -0.0479  0.0170** 
 (-1.64)  (2.04) 
Vegac 1.6558 -15.9375  
 (1.62) (-1.07)  
Cash_Compc -0.0455*  0.0194*** 
 (-1.78)  (3.05) 
D_Risk_AbR   -33.7713 -0.4034 
   (-1.43) (-1.26) 
Size -0.25111 10.1982* 0.2618*** 
 (-1.16) (1.79) (5.64) 
Cash/Assetsc   13.0602  
   (1.31)  
ROAc    -0.4465 
    (-1.25) 
Sales_Growthc 1.1779** 22.2453  
 (2.26) (1.39)  
Leverage_Change 0.3693 18.5230 0.1867 
 (0.74) (1.15) (0.58) 
R&Dc   61.0327 1.1641 
   (1.34) (1.63) 
Net_PPEc   -19.0574 -0.3231 
   (-1.23) (-1.17) 
CAPEXc   -38.7897 -0.0176 
   (-0.98) (-0.02) 
CEO_Tenure -0.0234 1.7198*  
 (-0.57) (1.70)  
Observations 1,509 1,509 1,509 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES YES 





Table 11 (Continued) 
Panel B: Non-Public Deals 
Variable D_Risk_AbR Deltac Vegac 
Intercept 2.3823** -0.5031 -3.8468*** 
 (2.16) (-0.10) (-12.71) 
Deltac -0.0817**  0.0014 
 (-2.14)  (0.12) 
Vegac 1.2657*** 5.8654***  
 (3.38) (5.07)  
Cash_Compc -0.0171***  0.0157*** 
 (-2.84)  (5.93) 
D_Risk_AbR   -0.6430 -0.3387* 
   (-0.27) (-1.76) 
Size -0.1855** -0.0809 0.2710*** 
 (-2.46) (-0.23) (14.82) 
Cash/Assetsc   4.3299***  
   (3.02)  
ROAc    -0.6110*** 
    (-3.24) 
Sales_Growthc 1.2151*** 8.0594***  
 (3.26) (5.65)  
Leverage_Change 0.6241*** 1.4429 0.0982 
 (2.84) (0.81) (0.59) 
R&Dc   -4.7880 1.0918*** 
   (-1.08) (3.27) 
Net_PPEc   0.9179 -0.4187*** 
   (0.69) (-3.32) 
CAPEXc   1.1299 0.6384* 
   (0.38) (1.82) 
CEO_Tenure 0.0493** 0.5358***  
 (2.06) (5.35)  
Observations 4,403 4,403 4,403 
Year-fixed Effects YES YES YES 







A. Appendix: Variable Definitions22 
Compensation Variables 
Delta The dollar change in the wealth of top five executives for a one percent change 
in firm’s stock price from ExecuComp. 
Vega The dollar change in the wealth of top five executives for a one percent change 
in the standard deviation of firm’s stock returns from ExecuComp. 
Cash_Comp The sum of salary and bonus payments to the top five executives from 
ExecuComp. 
Total_Comp The sum of top five executives’ salary, bonus, new stock and option grants 
and other forms of compensation from ExecuComp. 
 
Performance Measures 
CARs(-5,+5) The bidder's cumulative abnormal returns over an eleven-day event window 
(-5, +5) where 0 is the acquisition announcement date using the market model. 
The estimation period is from 200 days to 60 days before the acquisition 
announcement. Market returns are based on the CRSP value-weighted index. 
Synergy_Gains The sum of dollar-denominated gains for the bidder and the target. Dollar-
denominated gains are defined as the market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement date times the CAR (-2,+2) for each firm from CRSP. 
Bidder's_Gains The dollar-denominated gains for the bidder divided by Synergy_Gains if the 
latter is positive and 1 – dollar-denominated gains for the bidder divided by 
Synergy_Gains otherwise. 
3yABHR The bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily return following the acquisition 
effective date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold daily return of the matched firm 
for the same period from CRSP. 
3yABHR_PSM The bidder’s 3-year buy-and-hold daily return following the acquisition 
effective date minus the 3-year buy-and-hold daily return of the propensity-
score matched firm for the same period from CRSP. Propensity scores are 
estimated using Harford’s (1999) model to predict bidders. 
Risk Measures 
D_Risk The change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s stock returns between 6 
months following the effective date (+1 to +126 days) and 6 months preceding 
the effective date (-126 to -1 days) from CRSP. 
D_Risk_AbR The change in the standard deviation of acquirer’s abnormal stock returns 
between 6 months following the effective date (+60 to +185 days) and 6 
months preceding the acquisition announcement date (-185 to -60 days) from 
CRSP. Abnormal stock returns are calculated as the residual from the market 
model using the CRSP value-weighted index. 
Deal Characteristics 
Payment_Cash A dummy variable that take the value of one if the transaction is financed only 
with cash and zero otherwise. 
Payment_Equity A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed only with 
stock and zero otherwise. 
Cont_Equity A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the method of payment includes 
stock and zero otherwise. 
                                                          
22 When the variables bear the exponential symbol “c” (contemporaneous) in the analysis, they are calculated for 
the same year as the acquisition announcement. 
Mixed_Financing A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is financed by more 
than one means of payment and zero otherwise. 
Diversifying A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the acquiring firm and the target 
operate in different industries and zero otherwise based on the Fama and French 
(1997) classification of 48 industries. 
Public A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is a publicly listed 
firm and zero otherwise. 
Private A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is a privately held 
firm and zero otherwise. 
Subsidiary A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the target is a subsidiary firm 
and zero otherwise. 
Hostile A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the deal is characterized as 
hostile or unsolicited by SDC Platinum and zero otherwise. 
Relative_Size The ratio of the deal value reported in SDC Platinum to the market value of 
the acquiring firm 4 weeks before the acquisition announcement from CRSP.  
Firm Characteristics 
Months_Surv. The number of months the acquiring firm has survived since its first 
acquisition during the period January 1, 1981, to December 31, 2010 from 
SDC Platinum. If the company has not made another acquisition in the past, 
the variable takes the value of zero. 
Size The natural logarithm of bidder's market value of equity four weeks before the 
acquisition announcement date from CRSP. 
Runup The acquiring firm’s buy-and-hold daily return between 205 days and 6 days 
before the acquisition announcement date minus the buy-and-hold daily return 
of the matched firm for the same time period from CRSP. 
Cash/Assets The acquirer’s cash and cash equivalents to book value of total assets at the 
end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement from Compustat. 
B/M The book value of equity of the acquiring firm from Compustat divided by its 
market value from CRSP at the end of the year before the acquisition 
announcement. 
ROA The operating income of the acquiring firm before depreciation divided by book 
value of total assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement from Compustat. 
Sales_Growth The logarithm of the ratio of bidder’s sales in the year preceding the acquisition 
announcement (t-1) to sales in the previous year (t-2) from Compustat. 
Sigma The standard deviation of the acquirer’s market-adjusted daily returns from 
205 to 6 days before the acquisition announcement date from CRSP.  
Leverage The acquirer’s total debt divided by book value of total assets at the end of the 
year before the acquisition announcement from Compustat. 
D_Leverage The change in the ratio of acquirer’s total debt to total assets from the end of 
the year preceding the acquisition announcement to the end of the acquisition 
announcement year from CRSP. 
R&D The acquirer’s research and development expenditure to book value of total 
assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement from 
Compustat. 
Net_PPE The acquirer’s net expenditure in property, plant and equipment to book value 
of total assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement 
from Compustat. 
CAPEX The capital expenditures of the acquiring firm divided by book value of total 
assets at the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement from 
Compustat. 
CEO_Tenure The number of months the CEO of the bidder has served in this position at the 
time of the acquisition announcement from ExecuComp. 
 
